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Abstract  
 
Following the tragedy of 9/11 the impression we had of international terrorism changed 
dramatically. It became clearer that global terror organisations were deeply rooted within national 
societies, and counterterrorism strategies had to be reassessed as a consequence. We also learnt in 
investigating 9/11 that ccontemporary terrorist groups have a fluid structure which can be a real 
challenge for policy-makers, especially considering their use of force against civilian targets as 
well. Counterterrorism strategies have also implied a certain degree of encroachment on civil 
society which is seen as affecting life styles in ways that a few years ago could not have been 
thought possible. The changing nature of terrorism itself and the consequential actions taken by 
governments in order to tackle this issue are requesting new points of view on this subject. This 
paper aims to analyse policy positions on the matter, specifically the Patriot Act approved in the 
United States in the aftermath of 9/11, and by focusing on this issue, it will demonstrate how 
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terrorism has the power to deeply change 
public opinion and what actions are being 
taken by governments to inspire a sense of 
security in the population. The questions that 
need to be answered are, first, is the price that 
comes for security worth its cost?; and 
secondly, are the counterterrorism strategies 
endorsed so far are actually enough to deal 
with this complex matter? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to develop a complete analysis of the 
evolution of counterterrorism strategies it is 
important to focus on their effectiveness and 
embrace more comprehensive approaches. 
There is arguably a strong connection 
between counterterrorism policies and 
radicalisation, and understanding this 
interaction is crucial if we want to better 
realise how and why terrorist groups recruit. 
In this regard, Max Abrahms’ paper ‘What 
terrorist really wants: Terrorist motives and 
counter terrorism strategy’ 1  could lead the 
way in such a debate. Policy-makers often 
underestimate the importance of discerning 
the principles behind terrorist actions; they 
prefer to focus on terrorist actions 
methodology and endorse in short-term 
fighting strategies rather than developing 
long-term solutions by understanding the 
fundamentals of terrorism and terror’s 
foundations. The use of the term ‘fighting’ is 
not accidental as since 9/11 there has been a 
change in the perception of terrorism and in 
how it should be tackled. Before then, 
counterterrorism was seen as an internal 
security issue to face traditional anti-crime 
strategies similar to the ones engaged against 
national and international organised 
crime.  At the time of the 9/11 attacks al-
Qaeda was well known to national 
intelligence services but few believed in its 
power to export its ideology outside Middle 
East. 9/11 crisis proved that Western powers 
lacked in preparation and that they were 
unable to foresee a possible attack; moreover, 
it showed that the wide network of terrorist 
groups was able to strike everywhere and in 
every moment. Terrorism quickly became an 
enemy to fight with all means, regardless of 
the costs. Terrorism was not perceived as a 
way to accomplish a political ideal or to 
advocate a cause, but as a warfare strategy put 
forward by a rational actor. In this regard 
President George W. Bush based his rhetoric 
on fear in order to put emphasis on the need 
for a national security strategy designed to 
fight against terror. It became possible to 
develop a new strategy with terrorism as a 
target, and legitimate the Republican 
administration’s strategy, which saw in al-
Qaeda the perfect nemesis.
2
 The 
administration built its mandate around this 
‘enemy’ and gave birth to the Patriot Act.3 
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The effectiveness of the norms issued in the 
Patriot Act, however, are questionable and 
limited in their goals. Furthermore, President 
Bush responded to 9/11 with a mere focus on 
preemptive operations to prevent new terrorist 
attacks, with the aim of dismantling terrorist 
cells before they could act. By doing so, he 
arguably reduced the efforts towards longer 
term solutions for the problem of terrorism. 
Several studies have shown that the idea of 
individuals being ready to join a terrorist 
group guided by blind faith is partially 
incorrect. During the first stage of recruitment 
the social component has a significant role 
which seems more relevant than ideology,
4
 
and this could change our view on the whole 
recruitment process.
5
 These studies became 
more meaningful in relation to the 
transnational nature of al-Qaeda and Daesh: 
The content of their messages and the 
structure of these groups challenge the 
national intelligence units’ ability to locate 
and fight the cells. Furthermore, terror 
groups’ activities compels us, in the context 
of a coherent counterterrorism strategy, to 
consider the establishment of strong 
international cooperation networks with 
different countries. At the same time, the 
social attractiveness of these entities may 
require more than a traditional approach to 
face possible deviant actions. In this paper I 
will first analyse the nature of terrorist act 
itself, trying to outline the dualism terrorist-
terrorism and lay the basis for a better 
understanding of the reasons behind the 
choice of joining a terrorist group. The second 
part of the paper mainly focuses on the 
analysis of how the Patriot Act, as a relevant 
case study, showing how the use of fear – 
with a scary resemblance to terrorist strategies 
– has played a crucial role has affected 
American society. The last section is 
dedicated to the understanding of the 
connection between culture of fear and 
indigenous radicalisation, and I will try to 
explain the social features behind the 
development of terrorist cells inside Western 
societies. 
 
Terrorism and Terrorism     
 
Before considering the Patriot Act as a 
relevant example of a post-9/11 
counterterrorism policy, it is necessary to 
define the basis of the analysis and to do so 
we need a proper definition of terrorism. Due 
to a lack of consensus on the matter, it is 
better to use a semantic approach for the sake 
of this analysis. The Oxford Dictionary 
definition of terrorism is “the use of violent 
actions in order to achieve political aims or to 
force a government to act”. We have a quite 
similar definition in the strategic model, the 
decision to appeal to terrorist actions is a 
rational decision made in order to achieve a 
set of goals in line with the organisation’s 
rhetoric and ideology.
6
  The terrorist group 
that we are going to take into consideration 
5 
for this study is al-Qaeda. This group has a 
traditional structure made up of coordinated 
but independent cells, with a defined 
programmatic objective which operates with 
both conventional and unconventional 
warfare strategies. The Islamist terror 
network, born as resistance against the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan, evolved and 
inherited the place occupied during the 
previous decades by terrorist groups with a 
politically oriented ideology, such as the 
German Red Army Faction (RAF) and the 
Italian Red Brigade. The main difference 
between those groups is – apart from the 
different kind of rhetoric used to motivate 
their political claims – al-Qaeda’s 
international dimension and its ability to 
reunite a wide range of different affiliates 
despite their different national and cultural 
origins. The global extension of al-Qaeda 
together with its ability to infiltrate its agents 
inside Western countries (with a large use of 
sleeping cells which recall the strategy used 
during Cold War by the two superpowers), 
make its cells hard to localise and eradicate. 
Moreover, the Islamist terrorist group 
managed to create a feeling of clear and 
present danger as no one did in the past. 
Europe was not new to terrorist actions: 
Countries like Spain and the United Kingdom 
had already faced the threat of ETA and the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the 
Bologna massacre had left a bloody mark on 
modern Italian history. The main differences 
with the post-9/11 attacks was to be found in 
the common source behind the attacks, such 
as political ideology, and the relatively small 
size of the groups. The outsourced and 
independent structure of al-Qaeda made 
identifying their targets extremely 
problematic.  
 
Further attacks could have taken place 
anywhere, thus creating a sense of constant 
fear and expanding the impression of danger, 
de facto generating a sort of state of war. 
 
However, al-Qaeda mostly failed to achieve 
its political goals despite the political and 
media rhetoric and the massive success of 
their terrorist operations. Its actions were not 
enough to eradicate the Western presence 
from the Middle East and led to the exact 
opposite scenario, with a renewed 
commitment of the United States in the 
region. The work of Max Abrahms, already 
mentioned, can help explain why this has 
been so.
7
 The American author tries to 
demonstrate in what measure the assumptions 
of strategic models regarding terrorist groups 
are wrong. In this paper he recognises seven 
major puzzles within terrorist organisations 
tendencies: 
 
 The coercive ineffectiveness; 
 The use of terrorism as first resort; 
 The uncompromising nature of most of the 
terrorist groups; 
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 A protean political platform; 
 The anonymity of the attacks; 
 The fratricide attitude of certain groups; 
and, 
 The presence of a never ending tendency in 
terrorism. 
 
First of all Abrahms points out how terrorist 
groups are defined by a chronic coercive 
inefficiency, which he argues can be 
discerned from an historical point of view.
8
  
In al-Qaeda’s case, as already stated above, 
targeting American citizens inside the United 
States created an aftereffect in direct 
opposition to the organisation’s goals. 
Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s political agenda has 
evolved several times over the years: While 
born as an anti-Soviets resistance it became, 
once the war was over, an international 
movement which aimed to support local 
conflicts in Bosnia, Russia, Spain, and other 
countries of the region, to its final stage as the 
global herald of jihad.
9
 Terrorist groups are 
also outlined by an uncompromising nature as 
far as they tend to consider terrorism as prime 
and only resource to pursue their goals. Most 
of the time they are not open to dialogue to 
establish peace  and they tend to renew, as 
already stated for al-Qaeda, their narrative to 
keep up the fighting. They do so because of 
the fear that their main goal might become 
outdated and not enforceable due to shifts in 
the national political settings. The sum of all 
these factors supports the thesis which states 
that the irrationality of terrorist groups, thus 
invalidating the assumption of strategic model 
on the subject.  But if they are not rational 
actors, counterterrorism strategies have to 
take into account more variables than a 
simple cause-effect relationship. 
According to Abrahms, if several terrorists 
join a terrorist group it is not because they 
share its goals or ideal but because they are in 
search of a sense of belonging. Demographic 
studies show how these groups attract mostly 
marginalised and socially-alienated 
individuals, often with severe difficulties to 
integrate, for example single young men or 
widowed women.
10
 Other subjects susceptible 
are displaced persons and immigrants without 
family and far from their culture of origin. In 
his study of 172 global Salafi Jihadists, for 
example, Sageman shows that such factors 
are particularly relevant to al-Qaeda members 
as far as they can be categorised as cultural 
outcasts living on the margins of 
society.
11
  For many terrorists this feeling of 
belonging to an inclusive deviant group 
becomes more important than ideology or 
political aims. In Oliver Roy’s view al-
Qaeda’s common soldiers and their leaders 
are not aware of the most basic tenets of 
Islam, or of Bin Laden’s general political 
ideas. The recruitment strategy is focused 
mostly on young and directionless socially 
marginalised Muslim men.
12
 We will see later 
how the case of the 7/7 London bombers 
represents a perfect example of this 
7 
indigenous radicalisation. In a similar way, 
Daesh’s recruitment strategy follows the same 
frame as Bin Laden’s organisation. In most of 
the cases, foreign fighters and Daesh brides 
share a common background of 
marginalisation and exclusion. Moreover, 
they often come from a second generation of 
Muslims grown up in Western countries, 
where the lack of opportunities and the 
difficulty to become integrated in Western 
society may have made such individuals 
particularly vulnerable to the Caliphate 
dialectic. With this introduction it is 
interesting to evaluate how policy makers are 
trying to counter such international terrorist 
organisations. The case study selected for this 
paper is the American Patriot Act. 
 
 
The Patriot Act: A Story of Fear 
 
After the tragic and violent terrorist attacks 
which became known in history as 9/11, the 
United States had to face the first terrorist 
incursion into its homeland since the Second 
World War, when a Japanese attack woke up 
the sleeping power of the Eagle, changing the 
course of the war and probably of history. In a 
similar way, 9/11 changed our perception of 
the world: Suddenly the world became a 
dangerous place to live in, and ordinary 
actions like taking a flight became scary. 
With this premise it is quite understandable 
that President Bush had to devote his energies 
and skills to directly face such a threat to the 
most powerful country in the world.
13
 
Actually the White House has had to tackle 
similar issues over the past one hundred 
years, but none of those had threated the 
social fabric of the country in such a deep 
way. During the Second World War, the 
Espionage and Sedition Act (1918) led to the 
incarceration of over 120,000 Japanese-
American nationals in the name of national 
security.
14
  During the Cold War’s Red Scare, 
11,000 members of the Communist Party lost 
their jobs because of a Congressional 
decision. The difference in 2001 was the 
shape of the enemy. While the Japanese-
American citizens and the members of the 
Communist Party were an easily identifiable 
group, the new terrorists could hide anywhere 
in the country, ready to strike at the very heart 
of the United States. Anyone could be a 
member of one of al-Qaeda’s sleeping cells. 
How could citizens feel safe if even their 
offices or their houses were in danger? Strong 
measures were required and the Republican 
administration responded in a predictable 
way.
15
  
 
Every play needs an actor and the political 
process behind the Patriot Act is not an 
exception. 
The American national intelligence 
community, for example, demanded more 
powers in order to protect the country despite 
the fact that the kind of powers and 
8 
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authorities sought could in effect undermine 
the constitution itself. Following the 
Watergate Scandal and the Church 
Commission investigation, the National 
Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) arguably lost a 
significant part of their freedom of 
investigation on US citizens, in particular 
following the approbation of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA).
16
  
 
Now though the fear was that the new enemy 
of the Eagle was potentially hiding deep 
amongst its own population. Some of the 
same immigrants who had made the United 
States the first economic power in the world 
were now seen as possible threats to 
American national security. However, any 
kind of violation of citizen’s privacy was 
prohibited by the IV amendment, so the 
policy makers were required to find a 
reasonable justification to directly violate one 
of the ten pillars of the United States 
law.
17
Moreover, the as Republican hawks had 
never regarded immigration as healthy for the 
economy, the extremist wings of the party 
with xenophobic positions used the attacks as 
the basis for the control of immigration. The 
terrorist attacks, in other words, presented an 
opportunity to use fear as an instrument for 
advocating limitation of citizens’ 
constitutional rights: This was arguably an 
unfair trade of freedom for security which the 
citizens of the United States accepted with a 
smile on their faces.
18
 The national solidarity 
that rose from the ashes of an individualist 
society was probably the main actor involved. 
A large part of the population, after the shock 
for the attacks, looked again the ‘American 
spirit’ arguably lost during several years of 
American imperial decline. 
 
The results of such deliberations in the US are 
borne out in poll conducted by the NPR, 
Kaiser Family Foundation, Kennedy School 
of Government on Civil Liberties on 
November 12, 2001 (Table 1) in which 
American citizens were asked if they would 
have supported or opposed giving more 
powers to law enforcement agencies in order 
to reduce the threat of terrorism in the US.
19
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As shown in the Table 1 the majority of 
respondents agreed that measures to improve 
and enlarge the power of the public 
authorities to fight the war to terrorism were 
positive, even if this meant directly limiting 
their individual rights and liberties. As the 
table shows, 82% of the participants found it 
acceptable to authorise control of on-line 
activities of Americans or examining their 
telephone records. In the 21
st
 century such a 
violation of privacy appears frightening, 
although the most significant data is that the 
49% of the interviewees found it reasonable 
to detain terrorist suspects indefinitely 
without them being charged. At least half of 
the interviewees basically agreed to violate 
the IV, V and VI amendments for suspected 
terrorist. The word suspected is a clear 
example of how far the Americans were ready 
to go in the name of security. At this point, it 
is important to see what role the presidency 
itself played in the Act introduction.  
 
When President Bush took office, he was 
looking for an identity,
20
 legitimacy, and a 
legacy different from his father and different  
 
from President Clinton. Bush was elected 
with a lack of popular consensus (as is 
known, he lost the popular vote). He took the 
White House with a few electoral votes over 
his Democratic rival, and in addition, as 
Thompson has noted, the ghost of electoral 
fraud was persistent and consistent.
21
  The 
9/11 attacks in effect gave Bush the 
opportunity to change the course of his 
presidency. As a ‘heroic figure’, the President 
tried to bring together a divided country 
around the idea of him being a wartime 
president, ready to avenge the injustice and 
protect his country from its enemies.
22
  
George W. Bush found in 9/11 the right 
context for his leadership and a reason to 
apply a culture of fear as a way of gaining 
national consensus.
23
 In the word of Kellner: 
 
 [Moreover,] since the 
September 11 strikes, the Bush 
administration has arguably 
used fear tactics to advance its 
political agenda, including tax 
breaks for the rich, curtailment 
of social programs, military 
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buildup, the most draconian 
assaults on U.S. rights and 
freedoms in the contemporary 
period in the so called USA 
Patriot Act and a highly 
controversial and divisive 
March 2003 war on Iraq.
24
 
 
The Patriot Act was just the most vivid 
example of how this culture of fear made 
acceptable the unacceptable. In order to show 
to the world that the United States was hurt 
but not broken, the Bush Administration 
moved rapidly towards launching what 
became known as the War on Terror. The 
American war machine – its navy, army and 
air force – reacted fast and strong, hitting 
Afghanistan as the main base of al-Qaeda. 
Meanwhile, three senators (the Republicans 
Orrin Hatch, Arlen Specter and the 
Democrats Patrick Leahy) started to work on 
a draft bill called the Anti-Terrorism Act. 
Several points of this controversial draft were 
included in the ‘Provide Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism’ 
Act. The acronym itself, PATRIOT, was 
symbolic, designed to recall patriots, the 
heroes who founded the United States with 
their blood centuries before. The first drafts 
were referred to the Selected Committee on 
Intelligence, and from the beginning of the 
discussion, the Committee asked some 
representatives of the civil liberty groups to 
leave the room, in spite the fact that they had 
been previously invited to join the session. 
This episode has been a clear demonstration 
of how the dialogue on the text of the bill was 
undermined from the beginning.
25
 In spite of 
this situation the agreement between the 
Republicans and Democrats was still possible 
because of the sense of uncertainty and peril; 
in fact, no one in the House of 
Representatives or in the Senate was ready to 
bear the burden of opposing the bill in case of 
a new terrorist attack. It becomes clear then 
how extraordinary situations lead to 
extraordinary responses. In a pre-9/11 
situation it would have been more than 
impossible to predict that both political forces 
could find an agreement on such a 
controversial law. The Act was introduced in 
the House on the 23
rd
 of October 2001 and 
seven days later the lack of agreement with 
the Administration seemed to be solved. The 
final approval was just a matter of time and, 
when the time to vote came, just one member 
of the House voted against, Senator Russ 
Feingold, who complained about several 
points in the bill.
26
 His objections were 
ignored as the favourable vote reached was at 
near unanimity. A short debate (only twenty-
four days passed following the first draft 
introduction to the Presidential Ratification) 
showed lack of both options, and will, to go 
against the Act.  
 
The Patriot Act accomplished its first 
objective; it improved the perception of safety 
11 
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of the United States. People of the States 
regained their faith in the system although 
they lost a large part of their freedom. The 
reform of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) broadens the 
uses of wiretaps and the freedom of 
investigation in the citizens daily life. As 
Wong stated, the Patriot Act basically 
changed the status quo between executive and 
judicial power by weakening the 
constitutional rights of the Americans.
27
 The 
‘sneak peek’ allowed the police forces and the 
national intelligence community to search for 
terrorism clues without the presence or 
authorisation of the owner. Police could use 
FISA wiretaps for domestic purpose such as 
drugs or fraud investigation. The government 
gained also easy track and obtained 
information on medical records, student 
records, financial records, employment 
records, DNA samples, and drug tests 
records.
28
 The result was that freedom was 
undermined deliberately to protect democracy 
and order. How was this trade possible? The 
answer could be found in the fear 
management theory. 
 
This brief analysis shows us how the political 
environment could influence the policy-
making process. As Auken stated, the Patriot 
Act could be defined as a textbook case of 
fear management.
29
  
 
Bush’s political machine drove the political 
consensus amongst the elite in the post-9/11 
environment. Recalling the Lindblom idea: 
 
With the rise of democracy and 
the decline of undemocratic 
coercions, elites have become 
increasingly dependent on 
controlling minds in order to 
maintain their elite advantages, 
thus giving to unilateral 
communication a central place 
it never before had as an 
instrument of social control. 
But we still mindlessly discuss 
free speech largely as though 
the concept refers to discourse 
among persons all capable of 
voicing or writing.
30
 
 
The elite needs a form of control to drive the 
policy process more than the population itself. 
9/11 allowed the Republican administration to 
gather together all the political elite under the 
cover of the war on terror. The large majority 
approval in the House of Representatives and 
the near unanimity reached in the Senate are 
the vivid examples of how fear management 
gave its results. 
Even the Democrats found it hard to resist 
public opinion. Wong in his paper affirms that 
Bush’s use of fear could be seen as a way to 
gain more executive power and avoid social 
and political accountability.
31
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 Without Bush’s ‘political gamesmanship’ the 
Act would not have been able to obtain fast 
approval of the House and without a huge 
political debate. In this case a substantial role 
was played by the manipulated minds of the 
populations more than the actors themselves. 
The role of a good leadership must be to face 
requests and try to satisfy them without 
manipulation or intromission: Can the actions 
of President Bush, with the fear management 
strategy that pursued, be defined as politically 
smart but still acceptable – considering how 
deeply the Patriot Act undermined the 
American constitution? And is the use of a 
fear-based strategy able to tackle the twenty-
first century terrorism or does it create more 
harm than advantage? 
 
Fear of Radicalisation  
 
The presence of a foe is a useful tool for the 
creation of a climate of fear, and it is used to 
condition the masses and make them accept 
measures that can be connected to a sort of 
state of war. But once the desired effect is 
achieved – in this case, channeling of hate 
towards the terrorists and their sponsors – it is 
hard to control further collateral outcomes. 
An aftereffect of Bush’s fear strategy is the 
perception of the whole Muslim community 
as an enemy, a perception that could lead to a 
radicalisation of civil society.  One of the 
outcomes of the 9/11 was thus, 
unsurprisingly; a worsening in the attitude 
towards Muslims inside the United States. 
One of the outcomes of 9/11 then, was a 
worsening in the attitude towards Muslims 
inside the United States. This escalation is 
astonishing in number,
32
 considering that an 
increment of the 1600% hate crimes 
committed against Muslims has been detected 
by FBI between 2000 and 2001.
33
 These 
repeated attacks help to establish a sense of 
victimisation in the ethnic group that, in the 
case of the American Muslims right after the 
9/11 who were already facing the risk of 
arbitrary investigation and imprisonment, 
became acute. With rapid escalation these 
behaviours tended to create a gap in society, 
with the creation of a climate of constant 
mistrust that supports the terrorist 
organisation’s quest for new agents. This 
situation is emphasised by the image of the 
minority as a threat built by media, which 
harvest news based on the attitudes and 
prejudices within the dominant group of the 
country.
34
 Such stereotypes, in this case, 
worsen the perception of peril, and they are 
able to deeply influence the idea of the other 
based on their nationality, religion or 
ethnicity. In addition, as already stated before, 
a substantial part of the Muslim community in 
Western countries is affected by a low 
integration between the different ethnicities. 
For the sake of the analysis it is useful to take 
into consideration the situation in different 
Western countries. The France case is 
13 
 
emblematic considering the large number of 
second and third generation Muslims citizens 
in the country. Following recent studies a part 
of the population feels a systematic sense of 
discrimination and their access to job and 
careers is 2.5 times lower than their co-
citizens.
35
 A similar situation can be detected, 
as underlined by Kirby in his paper on the 
London bombers as “Self-starters”. The work, 
‘A case study in indigenous radicalisation and 
the emergence of autonomous cliques’, as 
part of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, in 
the United Kingdom showed that Muslims 
facing an unemployment rate up to three 
times higher than the general British 
population and usually living in degraded 
suburbs felt disenfranchised. At the same 
time, over the 33% of British Muslims claim 
that they or someone they know has been 
subjected to racism, hostility or 
discrimination due their religion, while the 
almost two-third of them share a feeling of 
political under-representation. These 
situations have helped in creating a climate of 
frustration and resentment which often gave a 
tacit consent to terrorist actions. Pursuant to a 
poll conducted in the aftermath of the 7/7 
bombing in London, 6% of Muslim 
community believed that the attacks were 
fully justified even if frightening, while 24% 
claimed to share some sympathy for the 
bombers or their motivations.
36
 Kirby also 
underlines how Farhad Khosrokhavar 
interviews with al-Qaeda affiliates in 
European prisons helped to have a precious 
insight on this matter.  
 
He analyzed the situation of Muslims in a 
Western country and he found out how Islam 
is equipped with an ideal structure capable to 
channel the rejection by the Western 
society. Islam crystallises the sense of 
alienation of many Western Muslims 
channeling their frustration for the society and 
the anger for being marginalised and 
dominated.
37
 Khosrokhavar also found out a 
phenomenon he defines as humiliation-by-
proxy. Political events like the ones in 
Chechnya, Palestine, Afghanistan tend to 
create the idea of Muslims being oppressed 
and exploited, awakening a sense of solidarity 
despite the distance or the fact that they are 
not the direct target of such actions.
38
 This 
solidarity is clearly magnified, as a result of 
discrimination and racial attacks inside 
Western countries because of the proximity 
and the sense of impending danger pervading 
their daily lives. By bringing again on the 
table the ideas of Sageman we are observing a 
bottom-up process, with highly motivated 
subjects willing to join the jihad, a sort of 
intelligence gathering 
process for the terrorist group. Once the 
subject is identified he or she is introduced to 
a small group able to create a sense of 
community and safeness while giving a 
purpose to his or her life. The presence of 
social bonds is often the reason that supports 
14 
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any ideological indoctrination. The London 
bombers, for example, all showed signs of 
alienation and tendency towards extreme 
behaviour, but they consolidated these 
tendencies and brought to the apex their 
indoctrination once they gathered as a 
group.
39
 In Sageman’s opinion, the formation 
of a clique is fundamental because its internal 
social dynamics are able to put pressure on 
the perspective agent to join the group and 
define a unique social reality with a strong 
collective identity and even stronger bound of 
friendship among the members. The demi-
reality created by the clique facilitates the 
escalation into extreme commitments due the 
increased sense of estrangement from the rest 
of society of its members. Step by step their 
individual identity is consumed and their 
reality becomes completely filtered by the 
clique vision, providing the moral 
authorisation to commit extreme actions in 
order to restore what is right.
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  This process 
can be explained thanks to the Control 
Theory, which is very useful in order to trace 
the likelihood of criminal or anti-social 
behaviour in relation with social structures 
such as school, family and the strength of the 
social bonds among the participants. The 
theory takes its first steps asking why the 
majority of population avoid deviant 
behaviours and then theorizes that our 
observance of certain rules is modeled by the 
bonds we have with the society? We are 
aware of the rules of the game and we respect 
them because everybody else does so. The 
more a subject is isolated and unbounded to 
the rules, the more he/she will feel free to act 
without taking them into consideration.
41
 In 
the case of indigenous radicalisation we can 
witness an erosion of the respect for 
conventional norms and values via an 
increasing religious militancy, emphasised 
and driven by an abundant internet 
propaganda. The rejection of the general 
Western society is strengthened by the 
growing social bounds among the members of 
the group rather than an official radicalisation 
programme held by an affiliated recruiter. As 
already stated, terrorism is a means to a 
purpose, a vehicle to express frustration and 
rage against an alienated society and fulfill 
the request of the group and being accepted as 
a member of it. The ideology is ultimately the 
engine behind the process, providing both a 
binding element for the group and the 
necessary narrative to concretely express their 
anger.
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It can be stated that one of al-Qaeda’s long 
term goals has been achieved despite the 
impossibility of completing their primary 
mission. They realised the idea expressed 
with the concept of ‘the Vanguard’, and 
inspired fellow Muslims, despite the land or 
the culture they lived in, to embrace the jihad 
against their own government and co-citizens. 
The acts of the London bombers, or the attack 
to Charlie Hebdò (in this case connected to 
15 
 
Daesh), although in partial autonomy from 
the main organisations’ control, can be 
interpreted as a long-term project of the 
above-mentioned terrorist group. Despite the 
congruence we must not confuse the general 
long term consequence of al-Qaeda strategy 
with the real dynamics leading this 
phenomenon. As stated above, the terrorist 
ideology is the fuel for a process that began 
independently from the very bottom of 
society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
As a direct consequence of this analysis, most counterterrorism strategies may be perceived as 
inadequate, thus underestimating the importance of social dynamics behind the formation process of 
terrorist groups. The contemporary strategies, as the Patriot Act we have analysed, try to control the 
population without being able to guarantee a long term solution to the problem. The understanding 
of the process of indigenous radicalisation is mostly undervalued. These methods and the strategies 
in force in many countries, despite the effectiveness in tackling the single terrorist cell, are not 
integrated in a wider framework able to stabilize the situation and fight the process at its roots. 
Moreover, the approval of legislations such as the Patriot Act only increase the fracture in civil 
society, while emphasising the climate of fear they were supposed to prevent. 
 
Many similarities can be found with the phenomenon of organised crime and gangs. These types of 
organisations fill up an empty space left by the State creating a sense of community and morality, 
different from the one shared by the rest of the society. Deviant behavior is recognised as legitimate 
and encouraged as they are judged as positive by the other members of the group. And as for those 
organisations, a simple approach aimed to fight their actions seems to be ineffective. In addition, 
the international nature of the threat tend to minimise the effectiveness of the mere control over the 
information made by the intelligence services. Terrorists could hit anywhere and they could be 
anyone. There is no intelligence in the world with enough men and resources able to effectively 
ensure a complete safety net against this type of threat. To answer the question made at the 
beginning of the paper an effective counterterrorism strategy should be featured by a multi-level 
approach with an intense cooperation among national and international actors. 
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 On a national level the legislators should focus their efforts on introducing integration policies able 
to reduce the need for an alternative to the state. Closing the gap between the different parts of the 
society is a first but necessary step to deprive those groups and individuals of a fertile ground to 
recruit and build their propaganda. At the same time a coordinate framework of investigation and 
operations should be undertaken under the aegis of competent international organs, such as the 
INTERPOL, with a strong cooperation between intelligence agencies and police forces. The 
progress made in the European Union with the EUROJUST project are reassuring but probably not 
enough. The paradox is exactly there: Trying to stop an international fluid entity, operating in a 
three dimensional world with a two dimensional strategy. A wide 
international agreement on the matter is a long way from being reached but progress so far has been 
made, and considering recent developments in the international scenario, more is yet to come. 
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